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THE CANON AND THE CONSTITUTION
OUTSIDE THE COURTS
Sotirios A. Barber*
James E. Fleming**
What would it mean for "the canon of constitutional law" if
we were to take seriously "the Constitution outside the courts"?
What would happen to the canon if we were to distinguish (as
Cass Sunstein and Larry Sager do) between the partial, judicially
enforceable Constitution and the Constitution that imposes
higher obligations upon legislatures, executives, and citizens
generally to pursue constitutional ends or to secure constitutional rights? How would the canon be affected by "taking the
Constitution away from the courts," as Mark Tushnet proposes, 2
or by adopting what Sandy Levinson has called a "Protestant"
rather than a court-centered "Catholic" approach to the question, who may authoritatively interpret the Constitution? 3
We are co-authors, with Walter Murphy, of a casebook,
American Constitutional Interpretation, which conceives the enterprise of constitutional interpretation on the basis of three basic interrogatives: What is the Constitution? Who may authoritatively interpret it? and How ought it to be interpretedt In our
treatment of the questions What? and Who? and in our selection
of cases and materials bearing on those questions, we commit
ourselves to a muscular conception of the Constitution outside
• Professor of Government, University of Notre Dame.
•• Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Faculty Fellow in Ethics,
Harvard University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000. We are grateful to
Walter Murphy for comments on a draft of this essay.
1. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1993); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213 (1978); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness ofConstituJional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410,419 (1993).
2. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton U.
Press, 1999).
3. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 9-53 (Princeton U. Press, 1988).
4. Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming and Sotirios A. Barber, American Constitutional Interpretation (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1995).
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the courts, rather than simply focusing on constitutional interpretation by courts and on constitutional law as the product of
Supreme Court decisions. In this essay, we briefly explore the
canon and the Constitution outside the courts in general and
then in particular with respect to a canonical, though wrongly
decided, case, DeShaney. We take up the matter of how casebook authors might show that the canon of the Constitution is
broader than the canon of the judicially enforceable Constitution. We raise the issue of DeShaney here, not to say anything
n.ew on the subject, but instead to put it on the table for discusSlOn.

We appreciate the many difficulties associated with the concern for the Constitution outside the courts. Though the nation
has not always moved toward a judicial monopoly of constitutional interpretation in all areas of constitutional controversy,
American constitutional history does exhibit uneven progress
toward a judicial monopoly of most constitutional questions, including most of the weightiest constitutional questions. Even
where doctrinal change seems largely epiphenomenal on social
and economic developments that occur "outside the law," the
formal Constitution does not catch up until the courts say so, and
the precise constitutional rationalizations of these developments,
factors in their future, depend also on the courts.
The judiciary's apparent grip on the Constitution can be
connected to a founding strategy to facilitate and foster private
economic pursuits from which the common good would emerge
as if by some hidden hand. As long as things go well or recovery
is just around the corner, a bourgeois citizenry is too busy living
to reflect much on its manner of living. Finding it easiest to believe that pleasure defines the good, and encouraged to do so by
the regime, the bourgeois citizenry degrades all other answers to
"ideology." This entrenches its answer so deeply that it is no
longer seen as one of several (debatable) answers, and the question goes neglected-rationally unanswerable, some come to believe. This neglect and depreciation of the question creates a
vacuum into which the courts are sucked by virtue of the way
constitutional language forces judges into philosophic reflection
and choice. (Justices finding a constitutional right to abortion,
for example, had to make and eventually defended assumptions
about the nature of liberty. 5 Opponents of the right, like Justice
5.
(1992).

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); P/mmed Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
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Scalia in Casey, predictably raised (second-order) philosophic
objections to the (first-order) attempt to define liberty. 6 Both
sides thus addressed formidable philosophic issues, even though
one side pretended not to.)
But bourgeois life has its attractions, and some of them (scientific progress, the corrosion of racial and ethnic commitments,
and an aspiration to prosperity for all responsible persons) leave
social progressives to complain less about regime norms than
about the gap between regime norms and public attitudes and
policies. Regime criticism is thus largely abandoned to the partisans of particular truths that are at odds with the bourgeois Constitution, like fundamentalist Christianity and Social Darwinism.
A Constitution outside the courts thus risks a stronger voice
for reactionary forces in formulating constitutional doctrine,
possibly through means like the state-legislative committees of
correspondence proposed by Madison's Report of 1799 on the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the Southern Manifesto in
opposition to Brown, and Ronald Reagan's refusal to acknowledge the precedential authority of federal judicial decisions in
certain disability cases under the Social Security Act. (We include, or will include, materials concerning all of these in American Constitutional Interpretation.) There is also Madison's
warning in The Federalist 49 that submissions of constitutional
questions to the electorate (an agency outside the courts) will
undermine the Constitution's legitimacy by involving it in partisan political clashes. Those who dismiss Madison's assumption
that constitutional doctrine can ever be other than partisan
might nevertheless share a Hobbesian fear of the worst consequences of allowing more than one authoritative interpreter of
our nation's basic law.
These risks are mitigated by further reflection, however.
Opt for one interpreter on any ground, Hobbesian or otherwise,
and that interpreter is, for familiar cultural and institutional reasons, most likely to be the judiciary. Propose a constitution outside the courts and you propose multiple interpreters, though a
practice of multiple interpreters cannot realistically hope for
much more than improvement of the judicial product on its own
terms and is likely to leave the judiciary on top in all but those
few areas the courts call "political." We say this because first-

6. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979-1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White & Thomas, J.J.).
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order constitutional discussion in America today is mostly about
what the "supreme Law" permits or prohibits. Altogether unlike the ratification debate, and largely dismissive of the Constitution's preamble, today's constitutional discussion has little to
say about what the Constitution promises by way of substantive
goods.
Most constitutional scholars do not even admit substantive
benefits of the kind delivered through the powers to tax and
spend as a category of constitutional discourse.7 Left and right,
constitutional scholars tend to assign such policy questions and
constitutional questions to mutually exclusive categories. They
tend to hold that the Constitution guarantees process rights and
"negative liberties" only, not substantive benefits. Such a view
treats substantive benefits afforded through the powers to tax
and spend as constitutionally gratuitous, not fulfillments of constitutional obligations. This view is so firmly established that the
Supreme Court was able to affirm it in a decision that might
have been seen as its reductio ad absurdum. The case was DeShaney; it held that a state has no constitutional duty to protect a
four-year old child from the predictable physical harm of a violent parent-in effect, that a person has no constitutional right
even to a minimal benefit of the night-watchman state. 8
The DeShaney Court might have said, not that it saw no
constitutional right, but that it saw no constitutional right that
was judicially enforceable. But this might have suggested constitutional duties and rights to benefits that are not judicially enforceable, constitutional end-states that judges can do little to
achieve. And this in turn would have implied the need for a constitutionally-minded electorate whose individual members would
be willing to pay higher taxes in pursuit of a nation whose qualities of life and government could serve as sources of pride. This
would have been a Constitution truly outside the courts, a nonjusticiable Constitution, a Constitution whose pursuit leaves the
judiciary little beyond the power to exhort. Precedent for such a
holding could have been the Court's dismissal of war-powers
questions as political questions (not to mention other instances
9
of judicially underenforced norms analyzed by Larry Sager ).

7. For an exception, see generally Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Instrumental
Constitution, 42 Am. J. Juris. 159 (1997).
8. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
9. See Sager, 91 Harv. L. Rev. (cited in note 1); Sager, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. (cited in
note 1).
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When the Court recognizes constitutional questions left to the
political branches-an appropriate concept when substantive
benefits (like national security) are involved, benefits pursued
through the powers to tax (or conscript) and spend-it implicitly
conceives the Constitution as a charter of benefits and concedes
a place for concepts like constitutional policies or ends (like national security) and corresponding constitutional duties, judicially unenforceable though they may be.
DeShaney's rejection of this approach in domestic politics,
and the academy's acquiescence in DeShaney, 10 suggest that
much current talk about "the Constitution outside the courts"
(with some notable exceptions 11 ) will be parasitic upon, reactive
to, or in any case in the shadow of the Constitution inside the
courts. Put another way, it probably envisions little more than
an extension of the practice of friends of the court filing amicus
briefs inside the courts. Consequently, outside opinions about
constitutional matters that are the subject of litigation will remain within the discourse of litigants and judges, a discourse
which asks not what is good, but what courts will do in fact (to
evoke Holmes's "bad man" view of the law 12), or what is required by fidelity to what courts have decided in the past.
Though our reflections here impart ambiguity to the phrase,
we do favor a Constitution "outside the courts," despite our appreciation of the risks on the one hand and our modest expectations on the other. One reason is our interest in the survival of
constitutionalist possibilities, in which we include fresh acts of
constitution making and reform of the public-spirited sort idealized in The Federalist. American constitutions are made outside
the courts, at least initially, and the Constitution of 1789 was
proposed and ratified as a set of means toward a culturally limited range of substantive goods that were explicitly held to be
more important than democracy itself; hence Publius's repeated
assertions (e.g., in Nos. 9, 10, 40, 45, 63, 71) in behalf of justice
and the welfare and happiness of the people as the ends of constitutional government and the tests by which popular government itself would stand or fall.
10. Here one might also mention the academy's acceptance of the Court's policies
regarding standing and advisory opinions, which reject key elements of this outside Const~tution, notably citizens' personal interest in public purposes-"citizenship," if you
will-and the substantive constitutional goods that could justify exhortation in the Constitution's name.
11. The notable exceptions include the works mentioned in this essay.
12. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
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To cultivate a sense of this outside Constitution in American
Constitutional Interpretation, we include, or will include, numbers of The Federalist, court cases and writings of American
statesmen and scholars that display different basic conceptions
of what the Constitution is and who may interpret it, and opinions of jurists and others that expose the influence on litigation
of the outsider's concern for the ends of government. DeShaney,
for example, is a clear answer to the question of what the Constitution is and an implicit answer to the question of who may
authoritatively interpret it. For different answers, readers of our
next edition will be directed to McCulloch, Federalist 45, Lincoln's Message to Congress of July 4, 1861 (along with his First
Inaugural Address), Roosevelt's 1944 State of the Union Address advocating a "second Bill of Rights," and Chief Justice
Hughes's opinion in Parrish ("the bare cost of living must be
met"). Each of this last group of statements views the Constitution in terms of substantive benefits that constitutional government is obligated to pursue. Our notes on these readings will
cite recent works by writers like Larry Sager, Mark Tushnet,
Mark Graber, Cass Sunstein, and Stephen Holmes, and earlier
articles by Frank Michelman, Robert Bork, and Susan Bandes.
Our next edition will explore whether, notwithstanding
cases such as Dandridge and Rodriguez (forebears of DeShaney), the Constitution outside the courts contemplates rights
to minimal subsistence and education. 13 That is, despite the slogans about "negative liberties," the Constitution might impose
affirmative obligations upon the legislative and executive
branches of government to provide a social minimum of goods
and services to meet the basic needs of all citizens. These obligations might entail rights to minimal subsistence and education,
even if such obligations and rights are not judicially enforceable
in the absence of legislative or executive measures.
We will conclude by sketching some thoughts concerning
two recent views of the Constitution outside the courts, Cass
Sunstein's judicial minimalism and Mark Tushnet's populist constitutional law (each of which we plan to discuss in the next edition of our casebook). Sunstein's development of judicial mini14
malism in his new book, One Case at a Time, can be inter13. One of us is pursuing such questions in considerably greater detail in other
work. See Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Constitution (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
14. Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme
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preted, in part, as an answer to his own earlier call (in The Partial Constitutionu) for taking seriously the idea of the Constitution outside the courts. 16 One might think that this call means
that not just courts, but also legislatures and executives, should
be fora of principle. As such, it is a valuable corrective to overdrawn contrasts between courts as the forum of principle and
legislatures as the battleground of power politics. But for Sunstein, who argues that legislatures and executives, rather than
courts, are the true fora of principle, the slogan "the Constitution outside the courts" practically has come to mean "get the
Constitution outside of the courts"! One also might think that
the call for the Constitution outside the courts promises to liberate constitutional theory from its court-centeredness-whether it
be the court-centeredness of those who are obsessed with courts
as vindicators of rights or of those who are obsessed with the institutionallimits of courts-or, in Mark Graber's term, to "delegalize" constitutional theory. 17 Yet, ironically, Sunstein's recent
work may end up shackling constitutional theory to concern for
institutional limits of courts-thus legalizing it with a vengeance.
Finally, Tushnet's recent book, Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts, 18 is the most thoughtful and provocative
expression of its genre. He offers powerful refutations of arguments for judicial supremacy and judicial exclusivity in constitutional interpretation. And he puts forward an attractive vision
of populist constitutional law outside the courts, one that rightly
emphasizes the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble.
But Tushnet does not establish that taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts requires, in his terms, "taking the Constitution away from the courts." By contrast, we contend for a
constitutionalism that takes the Constitution to legislatures, executives, and citizens, in order that their deliberations, like those
of courts, might be framed and guided by constitutional principles and aspirations.

Court (Harvard U. Press, 1999).
15. Sunstein, The Partial Constiturion at 9-10 (cited in note 1).
16. One of us has criticized Sunstein's notion of "judicial minimalisrn." James E.
Fleming and Linda C. McOain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 509
(1997). Here we draw upon that critique. Id. at 546.
17. See Mark A. Graber, Delegalizing Constiturional Theory, The Good Society 47
(Fall1996).
18. Tushnet, Taking the Constiturion Away from the Courts (cited in note 2). One
of us has developed a fuller critique of Tushnet's book. See James E. Fleming, The Constiturion Outside the Courts, 86 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2000).

